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ABSTRACT
Ideas  are  different  from  nearly  all  other  economic  goods  in  that  they  are  nonrivalrous.  This
nonrivalry implies that production possibilities are likely to be characterized by increasing returns
to scale, an insight that has profound implications for economic growth. The purpose of this chapter






chad@econ.berkeley.edu2 CHARLES I. JONES
1. INTRODUCTION
People in countries like the United States are richer by a factor of about
10 or 20 than people a century or two ago. Whereas U.S. per capita income
today is $33,000, conventional estimates put it at $1800 in 1850. Yet even
this difference likely understates the enormous increase in standards of
living over this period. Consider the quality of life of the typical American
intheyear1850. Lifeexpectancyatbirthwasascant40years,justoverhalf
of what it is today. Refrigeration, electric lights, telephones, antibiotics,
automobiles, skyscrapers, and air conditioning did not exist, much less
the more sophisticated technologies that impact our lives daily in the 21st
century.1
PerhapsthecentralquestionoftheliteratureoneconomicgrowthisWhy
is there growth at all? What caused the enormous increase in standards of
living during the last two centuries? And why were living standards nearly
stagnant for the thousands and thousands of years that preceded this recent
era of explosive growth?
Themodelsdevelopedaspartoftherenaissanceofresearchoneconomic
growth in the last two decades attempt to answer these questions. While
other chapters discuss alternative explanations, this chapter will explore
theoriesinwhichtheeconomicsofideastakescenterstage. Thediscoveries
of electricity, the incandescent lightbulb, the internal combustion engine,
the airplane, penicillin, the transistor, the integrated circuit, just-in-time
inventory methods, Wal-Mart's business model, and the polymerase chain
reaction for replicating strands of DNA all represent new ideas that have
been, in part, responsible for economic growth over the last two centuries.
1Ideally, the calculations of GDP should take the changing basket of goods and changes
in life expectancy into account, but the standard price indices used to construct these com-
parisons are inadequate. See, for example, DeLong (In progress) and Nordhaus (2003).GROWTH AND IDEAS 3
The insights that arise when ideas are placed at the center of a theory of
economic growth can be summarized in the following Idea Diagram:
Ideas ) Nonrivalry ) IRS ) Problems with CE
Tounderstandthisdiagram,rstconsiderwhatwemeanbyideas. Romer
(1993) divides goods into two categories: ideas and objects. Ideas can
be thought of as instructions or recipes, things that can be codied in a
bitstring as a sequence of ones and zeros. Objects are all the rivalrous
goods we are familiar with: capital, labor, output, computers, automobiles,
and most fundamentally the elemental atoms that make up these goods. At
some level, ideas are instructions for arranging the atoms and for using the
arrangements to produce utility. For thousands of years, silicon dioxide
provided utility mainly as sand on the beach, but now it delivers utility
through the myriad of goods that depend on computer chips. Viewed this
way, economic growth can be sustained even in the presence of a nite
collectionofrawmaterialsaswediscoverbetterwaystoarrangeatomsand
better ways to use the arrangements. One then naturally wonders about
possible limits to the ways in which these atoms can be arranged, but the
combinatorial calculations of Romer (1993) and Weitzman (1998) quickly
putsuchconcernstorest. Consider,forexample,thenumberofuniqueways
of ordering twenty objects (these could be steps in assembling a computer
chip or ingredients in a chemical formula). The answer is 20!, which is
on the order of 1018. To put this number in perspective, if we tried one
different combination every second since the universe began, we would
have exhausted less than twenty percent of the possibilities.2
The rst arrow in the Idea Diagram links ideas with the concept of non-
rivalry. Recall from public economics that a good is nonrivalrous if one
2Ofcourse, onealsomustconsiderthefractionofcombinationsthatareuseful. Respond-
ing to one such combinatorial calculation, George Akerlof is said to have wondered, Yes,
but how many of them are like chicken ice cream?4 CHARLES I. JONES
person's use of the good does not diminish another's use. Most economic
goods  objects  are rivalrous: one person's use of a car, a computer,
or an atom of carbon dimishes the ability of someone else to use that ob-
ject. Ideas, by contrast, are nonrivalrous. As examples, consider public
key cryptography and the famous introductory bars to Beethoven's Fifth
Symphony. Audrey's use of a particular cryptographic method does not in-
hibit my simultaneous use of that method. Nor does Benji's playing of the
Fifth Symphony limit my (in)ability to perform it simultaneously. For an
example closer to our growth models, consider the production of computer
chips. Once the design of the latest computer chip has been invented, it can
be applied in one factory or two factories or ten factories. The design does
not have to be reinvented every time a new computer chip gets produced
 the same idea can be applied over and over again. More generally, the
set of instructions for combining and using atoms can be used at any scale
of production without being diminished.
The next link between nonrivalry and increasing returns to scale (IRS) is
the rst indication that nonrivalry has important implications for economic
growth. As discussed in Romer (1990), consider a production function of
the form
Y = F(A;X) (1)
where Y is output, A is an index of the amount of knowledge that has
been discovered, and X is a vector of the remaining inputs into production
(e.g. capital and labor). Our standard justication for constant returns to
scale comes from a replication argument. Suppose we'd like to double the
production of computer chips. One way to do this is to replicate all of the
standard inputs: we build another factory identical to the rst and populate
it with the same material inputs and with identical workers. Crucially,
however, we do not need to double the stock of knowledge because of itsGROWTH AND IDEAS 5
nonrivalry: the existing design for computer chips can be used in the new
factory by the new workers.
Onemight,ofcourse,requireadditionalcopiesoftheblueprint,andthese
blueprints may be costly to produce on the copying machine down the hall.
The blueprints are not ideas; the copies of the blueprints might be thought
of as one of the rivalrous inputs included in the vector X. The bits of
information encoded in the blueprint  the design for the computer chip
 constitute the idea.
Mathematically, we can summarize these insights in the following two
equations. For some number  > 1,
F(A;X) = Y; (2)
and as long as more knowledge is useful,
F(A;X) > Y: (3)
That is, there are constant returns to scale to the standard rivalrous inputs
X and, therefore, increasing returns to scale to these inputs and A taken
together. If we double the number of factories, workers, and materials and
double the stock of knowledge, then we will more than double the produc-
tionofcomputerchips. Includingideasasaninputintoproductionnaturally
leads one to models in which increasing returns to scale plays an important
role. Notice that a standard production function in macroeconomics of
the form Y = K(AL)1  builds in this property.
Introducinghumancapitalintothisframeworkaddsanimportantwrinkle
butdoesnotchangethebasicinsight. Supposethatthedesignforacomputer
chip must be learned by a team of scientists overseeing production before
it can be used, thus translating the idea into human capital. To double
production,onecandoublethenumberoffactories,workers,andscientists.
If one incorporates a better-designed computer chip as well, production6 CHARLES I. JONES
more than doubles. Notice that the human capital is rivalrous: a scientist
can work on my project or your project, but not on both at the same time.
In contrast, the idea is nonrivalrous: two scientists can both implement a
new design for a computer chip simultaneously.
Confusion can arise in thinking about human capital if one is not careful.
For example, consider a production function that is constant returns in
physical and human capital, the two rivalrous inputs: Y = KH1 .
Now, suppose that H = hL, where h is human capital per person. Then,
this production function is Y = K(hL)1 . There were constant returns
to K and H in our rst specication, but one is tempted conclude that there
are increasing returns to K, L, and h together in the rewritten form. Which
is it? Does the introduction of human capital involve increasing returns,
just like the consideration of ideas?
The answer is no. To see why, consider a different example, this time
omitting human capital altogether. Suppose Y = KL1 . This is per-
haps our most familiar Cobb-Douglas production function and it exhibits
constant returns to scale in K and L. Now, rewrite this production func-
tion as Y = kL, where k  K=L is physical capital per person. Would
we characterize this production function as possessing increasing returns?
Of course not! Obviously a simple change of variables cannot change the
underlying convexity of a production function.
Thisexamplesuggeststhefollowingprinciple. Inconsideringthedegree
of homogeneity of a production function, one must focus on the function
that involves total quantities, so that nothing is per worker. Intuitively,
thismakessense: ifoneisdeterminingreturnstoscale,thepresenceofper
worker variables will of course lead to confusion. The application of this
principlecorrectlyidentiestheproductionfunctionbasedonhumancapital
Y = KH1  as possessing constant returns. Introducing ideas into the
production function leads to increasing returns because of nonrivalry.GROWTH AND IDEAS 7
Finally, the last link in our diagram connects increasing returns to scale
to Problems with CE, by which we mean problems with the standard
decentralization of the optimal allocation of resources using a perfectly
competitive equilibrium. A central requirement of a competitive equilib-
rium is that factors get paid their marginal products. But with increasing
returns to scale, as is well-known, this is not possible. Continuing with the
production function in equation (1) above, the property of constant returns
in X guarantees that3
FXX = Y: (4)
That is, paying each rivalrous factor its marginal product exhausts output,
so that nothing would be left over to compensate the idea inputs:
FXX + FAA > Y: (5)
If the stock of knowledge is also paid its marginal product, then the rm
would make negative prots. This means that the standard competitive
equilibrium will run into problems in a model that includes ideas.
Thesetwoimplicationsofincorporatingideasintoourgrowthmodels
increasing returns and the failure of perfect competition to deliver optimal
allocations  are the basis for many of the insights and results that follow
in the remainder of this chapter. This chain of reasoning provides the key
foundation for idea-based growth theory.
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the contribution of idea-based
growth models to our understanding of economic growth. The next section
beginsbyprovidingabriefoverviewoftheintellectualhistoryofidea-based
growth theory, paying special attention to developments that preceded the
advent of new growth theory in the mid-1980s. Section 3 presents the sim-
plest possible model of growth and ideas in order to illustrate how these
3Since X is a vector, the notation in this equation should be interpreted as the dot product
between the vector of derivatives and the vector of inputs.8 CHARLES I. JONES
theories explain long-run growth. Section 4 turns to a richer model. This
framework is used to compare the allocation of resources in equililibrium
with the optimal allocation. The richer model also serves as the basis for
several applications that follow in Sections 5 and 6. Section 5 provides
a discussion of the scale effects that naturally emerge in models in which
ideas play an important role and reviews a number of related contributions.
Section 6 summarizes what we have learned from growth accounting in
idea-based growth models, considers a somewhat controversial criticism
of endogenous growth models called the linearity critique, and briey
summarizes some of the additional literature on growth and ideas. Finally,
Section 7 of this chapter concludes by discussing several of the most im-
portant open questions related to growth and ideas.
It is worth mentioning briey as well what this chapter omits. The most
signicant omission is a careful presentation of the Schumpeterian growth
models of Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Grossman and Helpman (1991)
andtheveryinterestingdirectionsinwhichthesemodelshavebeenpushed.
This omission, however, is remedied in another chapter of this handbook
by Aghion and Howitt. Probably the next most important omission is a
seriousdiscussionoftheempiricalworkinwhatisknownastheproductivity
literature on the links between R&D, growth, and social rates of return. An
excellent overview of this literature can be found in Griliches (1998).
2. INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF THIS IDEA
The fundamental insight conveyed by the Idea Diagram is an idea itself.
And like many ideas, it is one that has been discovered, at least in part,
several times in the past, at times being appreciated as a deep insight and
at times being forgotten. A brief intellectual history of this idea follows, in
part because it is useful to document this history but also in part because it
helps to illuminate the idea itself.GROWTH AND IDEAS 9
William Petty, an early expert on the economics of taxation, identied in
1682 one of the key benets of a larger population:
As for the Arts of Delight and Ornament, they are best promoted by the greatest
number of emulators. And it is more likely that one ingenious curious man may
rather be found among 4 million than 400 persons. [quoted by Simon (1998), p.
372.]
Morethanacenturylater,ThomasJeffersoncameclosertocharacterizing
the nonrivalrous nature of an idea:4
Its peculiar character... is that no one possesses the less, because every other
possesses the whole of it. He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction
himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light
without darkening me. That ideas should freely spread from one to another over
the globe, for the moral and mutual instruction of man, and improvement of his
condition, seems to have been peculiarly and benevolently designed by nature,
when she made them, like re, expansible over all space, without lessening their
density at any point... [Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, August
13, 1813, collected in Lipscomb and Bergh (1905) ]
But it was not until the 1960s that economists systematically explored
the economics of ideas. Kuznets (1960) intuits a link between population,
ideas, and economic growth, and Boserup (1965) emphasizes how popula-
tion pressure can lead to the adoption of new technologies. Arrow (1962b)
and Shell (1966) clearly recognize the failure of models of perfect compe-
titiontodeliveroptimalresourceallocationinthepresenceofideas. Phelps
(1966)andNordhaus(1969)presentexplicitmodelsinwhichthenonrivalry
of knowledge leads to increasing returns and derive the result, discussed in
detail below, that long-run growth in per capita income is driven by popu-
lation growth.5 Still, neither of these papers knows quite how seriously to
take this prediction, with Nordhaus calling it a peculiar result (page 23).
Within two years, however, Phelps (1968) is convinced:
4David (1993) cites this passage in emphasizing that ideas are innitely expansible, a
phrase picked up by Quah (1996).
5Thelearning-by-doingmodelsofArrow(1962a)andSheshinski(1967)containasimilar
result.10 CHARLES I. JONES
One can hardly imagine, I think, how poor we would be today were it not for
the rapid population growth of the past to which we owe the enormous number of
technological advances enjoyed today... If I could re-do the history of the world,
halving population size each year from the beginning of time on some random
basis, I would not do it for fear of losing Mozart in the process. [pages 511512]
This implication then becomes central to the popular writings of Julian
Simon in the debates over the merits and drawbacks of population growth,
as in Simon (1986, 1998).
The formal literature on idea-based growth falters considerably in the
1970s and early 1980s. Much of the work that is carried out involves
applications of the basic Solow (1956) model and the growth accounting
calculations that subsequently followed. By the mid-1980s, many of the
insights gleaned during the 1960s were no longer being taught in graduate
programs. In part, this period of neglect seems to have stemmed from
a lack of adequate techniques for modeling the departures from perfect
competition that are implied by the economics of ideas (e.g. see Romer
1994b). This theoretical gap gets lled through the work on imperfect
competition by Spence (1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
Idea-based growth models are thrust to center stage in the profession
with the publication of a series of papers by Paul Romer (1986, 1987,
1990). Thesepapersmostespeciallythelastonelayoutwithstartling
claritythelinkbetweeneconomicgrowthandideas.6 Shortlythereafter,the
models of Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Grossman and Helpman (1991)
introduce the Schumpeterian notions of creative destruction and business
stealing, pushing idea-based growth theory further.7
6Thisbriefreviewobviouslyignoresmanyfundamentalcontributionstogrowththeoryin
order to focus on the history of idea-based growth models. Other chapters in this handbook
will lay out the roles played by neoclassical growth models, AK models, and models of
growth driven by human capital accumulation.
7Other important contributions around this time include Judd (1985) and Segerstrom,
Anant and Dinopoulos (1990).GROWTH AND IDEAS 11
3. A SIMPLE IDEA-BASED GROWTH MODEL
3.1. The Model
It is useful to begin with the simplest possible idea-based growth model
in order to see clearly how the key ingredients t together to provide an
explanationoflong-rungrowth. Tostripthemodeltoitsessence,weignore
physical capital and human capital; these will be introduced in the richer
framework of Section 4.
Suppose that in our toy economy the only rivalrous input in production
(theX variableintheintroduction)islabor. Theeconomycontainsasingle
consumption good that is produced according to
Yt = A
t LY t;  > 0; (6)
where Y is the quantity of output of the good, A is the stock of knowledge
or ideas, and LY is the amount of labor used to produce the good. Notice
that there are constant returns to scale to the rivalrous inputs, here just
labor, and increasing returns to labor and ideas taken together. To double
the production of output, it is sufcient to double the amount of labor using
the same stock of knowledge. If we also double the stock of knowledge,
we would more than double output.
The other good that gets produced in this economy is knowledge itself.
Just as more workers can produce more output in equation (6), more re-
searchers can produce more new ideas:
_ At = (At)LAt = LAtA

t ;  > 0: (7)
If A is the stock of knowledge, then _ A is the amount of new knowledge
produced at time t. LA denotes the number of researchers, and each re-
searchercanproduce(A)newideasatapointintime. Tosimplifyfurther,
we assume that (A) is a power function.
Notice the similarity between equations (6) and (7). Both equations
involve constant returns to scale to the rivalrous labor input, and both allow12 CHARLES I. JONES
departures from constant returns because of the nonrivalry of ideas. Ideas
are simply another good in this economy that labor can produce.
If  > 0, then the number of new ideas a researcher invents over a given
intervaloftimeisanincreasingfunctionoftheexistingstockofknowledge.
We might label this the standing on shoulders effect: the discovery of ideas
inthepastmakesusmoreeffectiveresearcherstoday. Alternatively,though,
one might consider the case where  < 0, i.e. where the productivity of
researchdeclinesasnewideasarediscovered. Ausefulanalogyinthiscase
is a shing pond. If the pond is stocked with only 100 sh, then it may be
increasingly difcult to catch each new sh. Similarly, perhaps the most
obvious new ideas are discovered rst and it gets increasingly difcult to
nd the next new idea.
With these production functions given, we now specify a resource con-
straint and a method for allocating resources. The number of workers and
the number of researchers sum to the total amount of labor in the economy,
L:
LY t + LAt = Lt: (8)
The amount of labor, in turn, is assumed to be given exogenously and to
grow at a constant exponential rate n:
Lt = L0ent; n > 0: (9)
Finally, the only allocative decision that needs to be made in this simple
economy is how to allocate labor. We make a Solow-like assumption that
a constant fraction s of the labor force works as researchers, leaving 1   s
to produce goods.
3.2. Solving for Growth
The specication of this economy is now complete, and it is straightfor-
ward to solve for growth in per capita output, y  Y=L. First, notice theGROWTH AND IDEAS 13
important result that yt = (1   s)A
t , i.e. per capita output is proportional
to the stock of ideas (raised to some power). Because of the nonrivalry of
ideas, per capita output depends on the total stock of ideas, not on the stock
of ideas per capita.








Growth of per capita output is proportional to the growth rate of the stock
of knowledge, where the factor of proportionality measures the degree of
increasing returns in the goods sector.









Under the assumption that  < 1, it is straightforward to show that the
dynamics of this economy lead to a stable balanced growth path (dened
as a situation in which all variables grow at constant rates, possibly zero).
For the growth rate of A to be constant in equation (11), the numerator and
denominator of the right-side of that equation must grow at the same rate.
Letting gx denote the growth rate of some variable x along the balanced





The growth rate of the stock of ideas, in the long-run, is proportional to the
rate of population growth, where the factor of proportionality depends on
the degree of returns to scale in the production function for ideas.
Finally, this equation can be substituted into equation (10) to get the
growth rate of output per worker in steady state:
gy = gA =
n
1   
: (13)14 CHARLES I. JONES
The growth rate of per capita output is proportional to the rate of popula-
tion growth, where the factor of proportionality depends on the degree of
increasing returns in the two sectors.
3.3. Discussion
Why is this the case? There are two basic elements of the toy economy
that lead to the result. First, just as the total output of any good depends on
the total number of workers producing the good, more researchers produce
more new ideas. A larger population means more Mozarts and Newtons,
and more Wright brothers, Sam Waltons, and William Shockleys. Second,
the nonrivalry of knowledge means that per capita output depends on the
total stock of ideas, not on ideas per person.8 Each person in the economy
benets from the new ideas created by the Isaac Newtons and William
Shockleys of the world, and this benet is not degraded by the presence of
a larger population.
Together, these steps imply that output per capita is an increasing func-
tion, in the long run, of the number of researchers in the economy, which in
turn depends on the size of the population. Log-differencing this relation,
the growth rate of output per capita depends on the growth rate of the num-
ber of researchers, which in turn is tied to the rate of population growth in
the long run.
At some basic level, these results should not be surprising at all. Once
one grants that the nonrivalry of ideas implies increasing returns to scale,
it is nearly inevitable that the size of the population affects the level of per
capitaincome. Afterall,thatisvirtuallythedenitionofincreasingreturns.
In moving from this toy model to the real world, one must obviously
be careful. Probably the most important qualication is that our toy model
8Contrast this to the case in which capital replaces the word ideas in this phrase.
Because capital is rivalrous, output per capita depends on capital per person.GROWTH AND IDEAS 15
consistsofasinglecountry. Withoutthinkingmorecarefullyabouttheows
of ideas across countries in the real world, it is more accurate to compare
the predictions of this toy economy to the world as a whole rather than to
any single economy. Taiwan and China both benet from ideas created
throughout the world, so it is not the Taiwanese or Chinese population that
is especially relevant to those countries' growth experiences.
Anotherqualicationrelatestotheabsenceofphysicalandhumancapital
from the model. At least as far as long-run growth is concerned, this
absence is not particularly harmful: recall the intuition from the Solow
growth model that capital accumulation is not, by itself, a source of long-
run growth. Still, because of transition dynamics these factors are surely
important in explaining growth over any given time period, and they will
be incorporated into the model in the next section.
Finally, it is worth mentioning briey how this result differs from the
original results in the models of Romer (1990), Aghion and Howitt (1992),
and Grossman and Helpman (1991). Those models essentially make the
assumption that  = 1 in the production function for new ideas. That
is, the growth rate of the stock of knowledge depends on the number of
researchers. This change serves to strengthen the importance of increasing
returns to scale in the economy, so much so that a growing number of
researchers causes the growth rate of the economy to grow exponentially.
We will discuss this result in more detail in later sections.
4. A RICHER MODEL AND THE ALLOCATION OF
RESOURCES
The simple model given in the previous section provides several of the
key insights of idea-based growth models, but it is too simple to provide
others. In particular, the nal implication in the basic Idea Diagram related
totheproblemsacompetitiveequilibriumhasinallocatingresourceshasnot16 CHARLES I. JONES
been discussed. In this section, we remedy this shortcoming and discuss
explicitly several mechanisms for allocating resources in an economy in
which ideas play a crucial role. In addition, we augment the simple model
with the addition of physical capital, human capital, and the Dixit-Stiglitz




the collection of production technologies, resource constraints, and utility
functions  is laid out. Any method of allocating resources is constrained
by the economic environment. Next, we present several different ways in
whichresourcescanbeallocatedinthiseconomyandderiveresultsforeach
allocation. The rst allocation is the simplest: a rule-of-thumb allocation
analogous to the constant saving rate assumption of Solow (1956). The
secondallocationistheoptimalone, i.e. theallocationthatmaximizesutil-
ity subject to the constraints imposed by the economic environment. These
rst two are very natural allocations to consider. One then immediately is
led to ask the question of whether a decentralized equilibrium allocation,
that is one in which markets allocate resources rather than a planner, can
replicate the optimal allocation. In general, the answer to this question is
that it depends on the nature of the institutions that govern the equilibrium.
We will solve explicitly for one of these equilibrium allocations in Sec-
tion 4.4 and then discuss several alternative institutions that might be used
to allocate resources in this model.
4.1. The Economic Environment
The economic environment for this new model consists of a set of pro-
ductionfunctions,asetofresourceconstraints,andpreferences. Thesewill
be described in turn.GROWTH AND IDEAS 17








Y t ; 0 <  < 1; 0 <  < 1 (14)
_ Kt = Yt   Ct   Kt; K0 > 0;  > 0 (15)
_ At = H
AtA

t ; A0 > 0;  > 0;  > 0;  < 1 (16)
Equation (14) is the production function for the nal output good. Final
output Y is produced using human capital HY and a collection of inter-
mediate capital goods xi. A represents the measure of these intermediate
goods that are available at any point in time. These intermediate goods
enter the production function through a CES aggregator function, and the
elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods is 1=(1   ) > 1.
Notice that there are constant returns to scale in HY and these intermediate
goods in producing output for a given A. However, there are increasing
returns to scale once A is treated as a variable. The sense in which this is
true will be made precise below.
Equation (15) is a standard accumulation equation for physical capital.
Equation (16) is the production function for new ideas. In this economy,
ideas have a very precise meaning  they represent new varieties of in-
termediate goods that can be used in the production of nal output. New
ideas are produced with a Cobb-Douglas function of human capital and
the existing stock of knowledge.9 As in the simple model, the parameter
 measures the way in which the current stock of knowledge affects the
production of new ideas. It nets out the standing on shoulders effect and
9Physicalcapitalisnotusedintheproductionofnewideasinordertosimplifythemodel.
A useful alternative to this approach is the lab equipment approach suggested by Rivera-
Batiz and Romer (1991) where units of the nal output good are used to produce ideas,
i.e. capital and labor combine in the same way to produce ideas as to produce nal output.
Apart from some technicalities, all of the results given below have exact analogues in a
lab-equipment approach.18 CHARLES I. JONES
the shing out effect. The parameter  represents the elasticity of new idea
production with respect to the number of researchers. A value of  = 1
implies that doubling the number of researchers doubles the production of
new ideas at a point in time for a given stock of knowledge. On the other
hand, oneimaginesthatdoublingthenumberofresearchersmightlessthan
double the number of new ideas because of duplication, suggesting  < 1.
Next, the resource constraints for the economy are given by
Z At
0
xit di = Kt (17)
HAt + HY t = Ht (18)
Ht = htLt (19)
ht = e `ht;   > 1 (20)
Lt = (1   `ht)Nt (21)
Nt = N0ent; N0 > 0; n > 0: (22)
Breakingslightlyfrommytaxonomy,equation(17)involvesaproduction
function as well as a resource constraint. In particular, one unit of raw
capitalcanbetransformedinstantaneouslyintooneunitofanyintermediate
good for which a design has been discovered. Equation (17) then is the
resource constraint that says that the total quantity of intermediate goods
produced cannot exceed the amount of raw capital in the economy.
Equation (18) says that the amount of human capital used in the produc-
tion of goods and ideas equals the total amount of human capital available
in the economy. Equation (19) states the identity that this total quantity of
human capital is equal to human capital per person h times the total labor
force L (all labor is identical). An individual's human capital is related by
theMincerianexponentialtotheamountoftimespentaccumulatinghuman
capital, `h, in equation (20). We simplify the model by assuming there areGROWTH AND IDEAS 19
no dynamics associated with human capital accumulation.10 Equation (21)
denes the labor force to be the population multiplied by the amount of
time that people are not accumulating human capital, and equation (22)
describes exogenous population growth at rate n.




Nsu(cs)e (s t) ds;  > n; (23)




;  > 0: (25)
4.2. Allocating Resources with a Rule of Thumb
Given this economic environment, we can now consider various ways in
which resources may be allocated. The primary allocative decisions that
need to be made are relatively few. At each point in time, we need to
determine the amount of time spent gaining human capital, `h, the amount
of consumption c, the amount of human capital allocated to research HA,
and the split of the raw capital into the various varieties fxig. Once these
allocative decisions have been made, the twelve equations in (14) to (25)
above, combined with these four allocations pin down all of the quantities
in the model.12
10 Thisapproachcanbejustiedbyasimpledynamicsystemoftheform _ h = e
 `h h,
where human capital depreciates at rate . It is readily seen that in the steady state, this
equation implies that h is proportional to e
 `h, as we've assumed. More generally, of
course, richer equations for human capital can be imagined.
11To keep utility nite, we require a technical condition on the parameters of the model.
The appropriate condition can be determined by looking at the utility function and takes
the form






 (1   )n:
12The counting goes as follows. At a point in time we have the four allocation rules and
thetwelveequationsgivenabove. Thefourrulespindowntheallocations`h, C, HA, fxig,
and then twelve equations deliver Y , K, A, HY , H, h, L, N, U, c, and u. The careful20 CHARLES I. JONES
The simplest way to begin allocating resources in just about any model
is with a rule of thumb. That is, the modeler species some simple,
exogenous rules for allocating resources. This is useful for a number of
reasons. First, it forces us to be clear from the beginning about exactly
what allocation decisions need to be made. Second, it reveals how key
endogenous variables depend on the allocations themselves. This is nice
because the subsequent results will hold along a balanced growth path even
if other mechanisms are used to allocated resources.
Definition 4.1. A rule of thumb allocation in this economy consists
of the following set of equations:
`ht =  `h 2 (0;1) (26)
1   Ct=Yt =  sK 2 (0;1) (27)
HAt=Ht =  sA 2 (0;1) (28)
xit =  xt  Kt=At for all i 2 [0;At]: (29)
As is obvious from the denition, our rule of thumb allocation involves
agents in the economy allocating a constant fraction of time to the accu-
mulation of human capital, a constant fraction of output for investment in
physical capital, a constant division of human capital into research, and al-
locatingtherawcapitalsymmetricallyintheproductionoftheintermediate
capital goods.
With this allocation chosen, one can now in principle solve the model
for all of the endogenous variables at each point in time. For our purposes,
it will be enough to solve for a few key results along the balanced growth
path of the economy, which is dened as follows:
counter will notice I've mentioned 15 objects but 16 equations. The subtlety is that we
should think of the allocation rule as determining fxig subject to the resource constraint
in (17). (For comparison, notice that we choose HA and the resource constraint pins down
HY . Similarly, but loosely speaking, we choose all but one of the xi and the resource
constraint pins down the last one.)GROWTH AND IDEAS 21
Definition 4.2. A balanced growth path in this economy is a sit-
uation in which all variables grow at constant exponential rates (possibly
zero) and in which this constant growth could continue forever.
The following notation will also prove useful in what follows. Let y 
Y=N denote nal output per capita and let k  K=N represent capital
per person. We will use an asterisk superscript to denote variables along a
balancedgrowthpath. Andnallygx willbeusedtodenotetheexponential
growth rate of some variable x along a balanced growth path.
With this notation, we can now provide a number of useful results for
this model.
Result 1. With constant allocations of the form given above, this model
yields the following results:
(a) Because of the symmetric use of intermediate capital goods, the








(b) Along a balanced growth path, output per capita y depends on
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(c) Along a balanced growth path, the stock of ideas is increasing












(d) Combining these last two results, output per capita along the
balanced growth path is an increasing function of research, which
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(e) Finally, taking logs and derivatives of these relationships, one
gets the growth rates along the balanced growth path:




gHA = g  
n: (34)
Ingeneral,theseresultsshowhowthesimplemodelgivenintheprevious
section extends when a much richer framework is considered. Result (1a)
shows that this Dixit-Stiglitz technology reduces to a familiar-looking pro-
duction function when the various capital goods are used symmetrically.
Result (1b) derives the level of output per capita along a balanced growth
path, obtaining a solution that is closely related to what one would nd
in a Solow model. The rst term on the right side is simply the capital-
output ratio in steady state, the second term adjusts for human capital, the
third term adjusts for the fraction of the labor force working to produce
goods, and the fourth term adjusts for labor force participation. The nal
term shows, as in the simple model, that per capita output along a balanced
growth path is proportional to the total stock of knowledge (raised to some
power).
Result (1c) provides the analogous expression for the other main pro-
duction function in the model, the production of ideas. The stock of ideas
along a balanced growth path is proportional to the level of the research
input (labor adjusted for human capital), again raised to some power. More
researchers ultimately mean more ideas in the economy.
Result (1d) combines these last two expressions to show that per capita
output is proportional to the level of research input, which, since human
capital per worker is ultimately constant, means that per capita output is
proportionaltothesizeofthelaborforce.13 Theexponent
essentiallymea-
sures the total degree of increasing returns to scale in this economy. Notice
13From now on we will leave the raised to some power phrase implicit.GROWTH AND IDEAS 23
thatitdependsontheparametersofboththegoodsproductionfunctionand
theideaproductionfunction, bothofwhichmayinvolveincreasingreturns.
Finally, Result (1e) takes logs and derivatives of the relevant levels
solutions to derive the growth rates of several variables. Output per worker
andcapitalperworkerbothgrowatthesamerate. Thisrateisproportionalto
thegrowthrateofthestockofknowledge,whichinturnisproportionaltothe
growth rate of the effective level of research. The growth rate of research is
ultimatelypinneddownbythegrowthrateofpopulation. Thislastequality
parallels the result in the simple model: the fundamental growth rate in the
economy is a product of the degree of increasing returns and the rate of
population growth. An interesting feature of this result is that the long-run
growth rate does not depend on the allocations in this model. Notice that
 sA, for example, does not enter the expression for the long-run growth rate.
Changes in the allocation of human capital to research have level effects,
as shown in Result (1b), but they do not affect the long-run growth rate.
This aspect of the model will turn out to be a relatively robust prediction of
a class of idea-based growth models.14
Pausing to consider the key equations that make up Result 1, the reader
mightnaturallywonderabouttherestrictivelinkbetweenthegrowthrateof
human capital and the growth rate of the labor force that has been assumed.
For example, in considering Result (1d), one might accept that per capita
output is proportional to research labor adjusted for its human capital, but
wonder whether one can get more action on the growth side by letting
human capital per researcher grow endogenously (in contrast, it is constant
in this model).
14This invariance result can be overturned in models in which the population growth rate
is an endogenous variable, but the direction of the effects are sometimes odd. See Jones
(2003).24 CHARLES I. JONES
The answer is that it depends on how one models human capital accumu-
lation. Therearemanyricherspecicationsofhumancapitalaccumulation
thatdeliverresultsthatultimatelyresemblethosein Result1. One example
is given in footnote 10. Another is given in Chapter 6 of Jones (2002a). In
thislatterexample, anindividual'shumancapitalrepresentsthemeasureof
ideas that the individual knows how to work with, which grows over time
along a balanced growth path paralleling the growth in knowledge.
An example in which one gets endogenous growth in human capital per
workeroccurswhenonespeciesanaccumulationequationthatislinearin
thestockofhumancapitalitself: _ h = e `hh,reminiscentofLucas(1988).
For reasons discussed below in Section 6.2, this approach is unsatisfactory,
at least in my view.
4.3. The Optimal Allocation of Resources
The next allocation we will consider is the optimal allocation. That is,
weseektosolvefortheallocationofresourcesthatmaximizeswelfare. Be-
causethismodelisbasedonarepresentativeagent, thisisastraightforward
objective, and the optimal allocation is relatively easy to solve for.
Definition 4.3. The optimal allocation of resources in this econ-
omy consists of time paths fct;`ht;sAt;fxitgg1
t=0 that maximize utility Ut
at each point in time given the economic environment, i.e. given equa-
tions (14) to (25), where sAt  HAt=Ht.
Insolvingfortheoptimalallocationofresources,itisconvenienttowork
with the following current-value Hamiltonian:
Ht = u(ct) + 1t(yt   ct   (n + )kt) + 2ts
Ath








t [(1   sAt)ht(1   `ht)]1 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This last equation incorporates the fact that because of symmetry, the op-
timal allocation of resources requires the capital goods to be employed in
equal quantities.
The current-value Hamiltonian Ht reects the utility value of what gets
producedattimet: theconsumption, thenetinvestment, andthenewideas.
AssuggestedbyWeitzman(1976),itistheutilityequivalentofnetdomestic
product. The necessary rst-order conditions for an optimal allocation can
then be written as a set of three control conditions @Ht=@mt = 0, where








with their corresponding transversality conditions limt!1 ite  tzt = 0.
In these expressions, z is a placeholder for k and A, with i = 1;2 respec-
tively and   =    n is the effective rate of time preference. The arbitrage
interpretationequatestheeffectiverateoftimepreferencetothedividend
and capital gain associated with owning either capital or ideas, where the
dividend is the additional ow of utility, @Ht=@zt.
Result 2. In this economy with the optimal allocation of resources, we
have the following results:
(a) All of the results in Result 1 continue to hold, provided the
allocations are interpreted as the optimal allocations rather than the
rule-of-thumballocations. Forexample,outputperpersonalongthe
balanced growth path is proportional to the stock of ideas (raised to
some power), which in turn is proportional to the effective amount
of research and therefore to the size of the population. As another
example, the key growth rates of the economy are determined as
in equation (34), i.e. they are ultimately proportional to the rate of
population growth where the factor of proportionality measures the
degree of increasing returns in the economy.26 CHARLES I. JONES
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(c) The optimal allocation of labor to research equates the value of
the marginal product of labor in producing goods to the value of
the marginal product of labor in producing new ideas. One way of












where the op superscript denotes the optimal allocation. This
equation says that the ratio of labor working to produce ideas to
labor working to produce goods is equal to labor's contribution to
the value of the new ideas that get produced divided by labor's
contribution to the value of output per person that gets produced.
Notice that 2=1 is essentially the relative price of a new idea in
units of output per person.









r (gY  gA) gA _ At
(1   )Yt
(40)
where r   + gc functions as the effective interest rate for
discounting future output to the present. The relative price of a
new idea is given by the presented discounted value of the marginal
product of the new idea in the goods production function. This
marginal product at one point in time is Y=A, and the equation
divides by r   (gY   gA)   gA to adjust for time discounting,
growth in this marginal product over time at rate gY   gA, and an
adjustmentforthefactthateachnewideahelpstoproduceadditional
ideasaccordingtothespilloverparameter. Finally,onecancancel
theY 'sfromthenumeratoranddenominatorandreplace _ A=AbygA
to get a closed-form solution for the allocation of labor to research
along a balanced growth path.GROWTH AND IDEAS 27
(d)Theoptimalsavingrateinthiseconomyalongabalancedgrowth
path can be solved for from the Euler equation and the capital ac-




(n + g + )
 +  + g
(41)
where g is the underlying growth rate of the economy, given in
Result (1e). Notice that the optimal investment rate is proportional
totheratioofthemarginalproductofcapitalevaluatedatthegolden
rule, n + g + , to the marginal product of capital evaluated at the
modied golden rule,  +  + g.
(e) The optimal allocation of time to human capital accumulation is
straightforwardinthismodel,andessentiallycomesdowntopicking
`h to maximize e `h(1   `h). The solution is to set `
op
ht = 1   1= 
for all t. As mentioned before, this model introduces human capital
in a simple fashion, so the optimal allocation is correspondingly
simple.
4.4. A Romer-Style Equilibrium with Imperfect Competition
A natural question to ask at this point is whether some kind of market
equilibrium can reproduce the optimal allocation of resources. The discus-
sion at the beginning of this chapter made clear the kind of problems that
an equilibrium allocation will have to face: the economy is characterized
by increasing returns and therefore a standard competitive equilibrium will
generally not exist and will certainly not generate the optimal allocation of
resources. We are forced to depart from a perfectly competitive economy
with no externalities, and therefore one will not be surprised to learn in
this section that the equilibrium economy, in the absence of some kind of
policy intervention, does not generally reproduce the optimal allocation of
resources.
In this section, we study the equilibrium with imperfect competition
rst described for a model like this by Romer (1990). Romer built on the28 CHARLES I. JONES
analysis by Ethier (1982), who extended the consumer variety approach to
imperfectcompetitionofSpence(1976)andDixitandStiglitz(1977)tothe
production side of the economy. The economic environment (potentially)
involves departures from constant returns in two places, the production
function for the consumption-output good and the production function for
ideas. We deal with these departures by introducing imperfect competition
for the former and externalities for the latter.
Briey, the economy consists of three sectors. A nal goods sector
produces the consumption-capital-output good using labor and a collection
of capital goods. The capital goods sector produces a variety of different
capital goods using ideas and raw capital. Finally, the research sector
employs human capital in order to produce new ideas, which in this model
are represented by new kinds of capital goods. The nal goods sector and
theresearchsectorareperfectlycompetitiveandcharacterizedbyfreeentry,
while the capital goods sector is the place where imperfect competition is
introduced. When a new design for a capital good is discovered, the design
is awarded an innitely-lived patent. The owner of the patent has the
exclusive right to produce and sell the particular capital good and therefore
acts as a monopolist in competition with the producers of other kinds of
capital goods. The monopoly prots that ow to this producer ultimately
constitute the compensation to the researchers who discovered the new
design in the rst place.
As is usually the case, dening the equilibrium allocation of resources in
agrowthmodelismorecomplicatedthandeningtheoptimalallocationof
resources (if for no other reason than that we have to specify markets and
prices). We will begin by stating the key decision problems that have to
be solved by the various agents in the economy and then we will put these
together in our formal denition of equilibrium.GROWTH AND IDEAS 29
Problem(HH).Householdssolveastandardoptimizationproblem,choos-
ing a time path of consumption and an allocation of time. That is, taking







_ vt = (rt   n)vt + wtht`t   ct; v0 given; (43)
ht = e `ht; (44)
`ht + `t = 1; (45)






0 (rs n)ds  0: (47)
where vt is the nancial wealth of an individual, wt is the wage rate per
unit of human capital, and rt is the interest rate.
Problem (FG). A perfectly competitive nal goods sector takes the vari-
etyofcapitalgoodsinexistenceasgivenandusestheproductiontechnology
in equation (14) to produce output. That is, at each point in time t, taking
the wage rate wt, the measure of capital goods At, and the prices of the














who owns a patent for the good, purchased at a one-time price PAt. As
discussed in describing the economic environment, one unit of the capital
good can be produced with one unit of raw capital. The monopolist sees
a downward-sloping demand curve for her product from the nal goods30 CHARLES I. JONES
sector and chooses a price to maximize prots. That is, at each point in
time and for each capital good i, a monopolist solves
max
pit
it  (pit   rt   )x(pit) (49)
wherex(pit)isthedemandfromthenalgoodssectorforintermediategood
i if the price is pit. This demand curve comes from a rst-order condition
in Problem (FG). The monopoly prots are the revenue from sales of the
capital goods less the cost of the capital need to produce the capital goods
(including depreciation). The monopolist is small relative to the economy
and therefore takes aggregate variables and the interest rate rt as given.15
Problem (R&D). The research sector produces ideas according to the
production function in equation (16). However, each individual researcher
is small and takes the productivity of the idea production function as given.
In particular, each researcher assumes that the idea production function is
_ At =  tHAt: (50)
Thatis,theduplicationeffectsassociatedwithandtheknowledgespillovers
associated with  in equation (16) are assumed to be external to the indi-
vidual researcher. In this perfectly competitive research sector, the repre-
sentative research rm solves
max
HAt
PAt tHAt   wtHAt; (51)
taking the price of ideas PAt, research productivity  t, and the wage rate
wt as given.
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Now that these decision problems have been described, we are ready to
dene an equilibrium with imperfect competition for this economy.
Definition 4.4. An equilibrium with imperfect competition in this
economyconsistsoftimepathsfortheallocationsfct;`ht;`t;fxitg;Yt;Kt,
vt;fitg;HY t;HAt;Ht;ht;Lt;Nt;At;  tg1
t=0andpricesfwt;rt;fpitg;PAtg1
t=0
such that for all t:
1. ct, vt, ht, `ht and `t solve Problem (HH).
2. fxitg and HY t solve Problem (FG).
3. pit and it solve Problem (CG) for all i 2 [0;At].
4. HAt solves Problem (R&D).
5. (rt) The capital market clears: Vt  vtNt = Kt + PAtAt.
6. (wt) The labor market clears: HY t + HAt = Ht.




8. (Kt) The capital resource constraint is satised:
R At
0 xitdi = Kt.




10. Yt is given by the production function in (14).
11. At is given by the production function in (16).
12. Ht = htLt.
13. Lt = `tNt and Nt = N0ent.
Notice that, roughly speaking, there are twenty equilibrium objects that
are part of the denition of equilibrium and there are twenty equations
described in the conditions for equilibrium that determine these objects
at each point in time.16 Not surprisingly, one cannot solve in general for
the equilibrium outside of the balanced growth path, but along a balanced
growth path the solution is relatively straightforward, and we have the
following results.
16The condition omitted from this denition of equilibrium is the law of motion for the
capital stock, given in the economic environment in equation (15). That this equation
holds in equilibrium is an implication of Walras' Law. It can be derived in equilibrium by
differentiating the capital market clearing condition that V = K + PAA with respect to
time and making the natural substitutions.32 CHARLES I. JONES
Result 3. In the equilibrium with imperfect competition:
(a) All of the results in Result 1 continue to hold along the bal-
anced growth path, provided the allocations are interpreted as the
equilibrium allocations rather than the rule-of-thumb allocations.
For example, output per person along the balanced growth path is
proportional to the stock of ideas (raised to some power), which in
turnisproportionaltotheeffectiveamountofresearchandtherefore
to the size of the population. As another example, the key growth
ratesoftheeconomyaredeterminedasinequation(34),i.e. theyare
ultimately proportional to the rate of population growth where the
factor of proportionality measures the degree of increasing returns
in the economy.
(b) The Euler equation for consumption and the allocation of time
to human capital accumulation are undistorted in this equilibrium.
That is, the equations that apply are identical to the equations de-








t   ) (52)
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eq
ht = 1   1=  (53)
(c)ThesolutiontoProblem(CG)involvesamonopolymarkupover










t + ) (54)
Becauseofthismonopolymarkup,however,capitalispaidlessthan







Because the equilibrium economy grows at the same rate as the
economy with optimal allocations, the steady-state interest rate de-
termined from the Euler equation is the same in the two economies.
Therefore, the fact that capital is paid less than its marginal productGROWTH AND IDEAS 33
translates into a suboptimally low capital-output ratio in the equi-
librium economy. Similarly, the equilibrium investment rate along
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(e) The equilibrium allocation of human capital to research equates
the wage of human capital in producing goods to its wage in pro-












The ratio of the share of human capital working to produce ideas to
that working to produce goods is equal to the value of the output of
new ideas divided by labor's share of the value of nal goods.














which is directly comparable to the optimal allocation in equa-
tion (40). In comparing these two equations, we see three differ-
ences. The rst two differences reect the externalities in the idea
production function. The true marginal product of human capital in
researchislowerbyafactorof < 1thantheequilibriumeconomy
recognizesbecauseofthecongestion/duplicationexternality, which
tends to lead the equilibrium to overinvest in research. On the other
hand, the equilibrium allocation ignores the fact that the discovery
of new ideas may raise the future productivity of research if  > 0.
This changes the effective rate at which the ow of future ideas
is discounted, potentially causing the equilibrium to underinvest in
research. Finally, the third difference reects the appropriability of
returns. A new idea raises the current level of output in the nal
goodssectoraccordingtothemarginalproductY=A. However,the
researchsectorappropriatesonlythefraction < 1ofthismarginal34 CHARLES I. JONES
product. Thereasonisfamiliarfromthestandardmonopolydiagram
in undergraduate classes: the prots appropriated by a monopolist
are strictly lower than the consumer surplus created by that mo-
nopolist. This appropriability effect works to cause the equilibrium
allocation of human capital to research to be too low. Overall, these
threedistortionsdonotallworkinthesamedirection, sothattheory
cannot tell us whether the equilibrium allocation to research is too
high or too low.
4.5. Discussion
Let's step back for a moment to take stock of what we learn from the
developments in this section. The most important nding is Result 1, to-
gether with the fact that it carries over into the other allocations as Result
(2a)andResult(3a). Thisresultissimplyaconrmationofthebasicresults
from the simple model in Section 3. Because of the nonrivalrous nature of
ideas, output per person depends on the total stock of ideas in the economy
instead of the per capita stock of ideas. This is a direct implication of the
fact that nonrivalry leads to increasing returns to scale. In turn, it implies
that output per capita, in the long run, is an increasing function of the total
amount of research, which in turn is an increasing function of the scale of
theeconomy,measuredbythesizeofitstotalpopulation. Log-differencing
this statement, we see that the growth rate of output per worker ultimately
depends on the growth rate of the number of researchers and therefore on
the growth rate of population. This has been analyzed and discussed ex-
tensively in a number of recent papers; these will be reviewed in detail in
Section 5 below.
The second main nding from models like this is that the equilibrium
allocation of resources is not generally optimal, at least not in the absence
of some kind of policy intervention. Here, the allocation of resources to
the production of new ideas can be either too high or too low, as discussedGROWTH AND IDEAS 35
above.17 In addition, investment rates are too low in equilibrium, reecting
the fact that capital is paid less than its marginal product so that some
resources are available to compensate inventive effort.
Inthisequilibrium, thesuboptimalallocationofresourcesiseasilyreme-
died. A subsidy to capital accumulation and a subsidy or tax on research
can be nanced with lump sum taxes in order to generate the optimal allo-
cation of resources. A useful exercise is to solve for the equilibrium in the
presence of such taxes in order to determine the optimal tax rates along a
balanced growth path.
Giventhesimplicityofthiseconomicenvironment,thereexistalternative
institutions that are equally effective in getting optimal allocations. For
example, consider a perfectly competitive economy in which all research
is publicly-funded. The government raises revenue with lump-sum taxes
and uses these taxes to hire researchers that produce new ideas. These new
ideas are then released into the public domain where anyone can use them
to produce capital goods in perfect competition.18
Inpracticeofcourse,onesuspectsthatobtainingtheoptimalallocationof
resources is more difcult than either the world of imperfect competition
with taxes and subsidies or the perfectly-competitive world with public
funding of research suggest. There are many different directions for re-
17This conclusion also holds true in the Schumpeterian growth models of Aghion and
Howitt (1992) and Grossman and Helpman (1991) discussed in Chapter 2 ??? of this
handbook, but for a different reason. In these quality-ladder models, a rm discovers a
better version of an existing product, displacing the incumbent producer. Some of the rents
earned by the innovator are the result of past discoveries, and some of the rents earned
by future innovators will be due to the discovery of the current innovator. This business
stealing creates another distortion in the allocation of resources to research. Because an
innovatoressentiallystealsrstandgetsexpropriatedlater,theeffectofthisbusinessstealing
distortionistopromoteexcessiveresearch. Becausethemodelalsofeaturesappropriability
problems and knowledge spillovers, the equilibrium amount of research can be either too
high or too low in these models.
18A useful exercise here is to dene the competitive equilibrium with public funding of
research and to solve for optimal taxes and public expenditure.36 CHARLES I. JONES
search, many different kinds of labor (different skill levels and talents), and
individual effort choices that are unobserved by the government. Indeed,
the available evidence suggests that the allocation of resources to research
falls short of the optimal level. Jones and Williams (1998) take advantage
of a large body of empirical work in the productivity literature to conclude
that the social rate of return to research substantially exceeds the private
rate of return, suggesting that research effort falls short of the optimum.
The implication of this is that there is no reason to think that we have
foundthebestinstitutionsforgeneratingtheoptimalallocationofresources
to research. Institutions like the patent system or the Small Business In-
novative Research (SBIR) grants program are themselves ideas. These
institutions have evolved over time to promote an efcient allocation of
resources, but it is almost surely the case that better institutions  better
ideas  are out there to be discovered.
Interestingly, this result can be illustrated within the model itself. Notice
how much easier it is to dene the optimal allocation than it is to dene
the equilibrium allocation. The equilibrium with imperfect competition
requiresthemodelertobecleverandtocomeupwiththerightinstitutions
(e.g., a patent system, monopolistic competition, and the appropriate taxes
and subsidies) to make everything work out. In reality, society must invent
and implement these institutions.
Three recent papers deserve mention in this context. Romer (2000) ar-
gues that subsidizing the key input into the production of ideas  human
capital in the form of college graduates with degrees in engineering and the
natural sciences  is preferable to government subsidies downstream like
theSBIRprogram. Kremer(1998)notesthelargeex-postmonopolydistor-
tions associated with patents in the pharmaceutical industry and elsewhere
and proposes a new mechanism for encouraging innovation. In particular,
he suggests that the government (or other altruistic organizations such asGROWTH AND IDEAS 37
charitable foundations) should consider purchasing the patents for partic-
ular innovations and releasing them into the public domain to eliminate
the monopoly distortion. Boldrin and Levine (2002), in a controversial
paper, are even more critical of existing patent and copyright systems and
propose restricting them severely or even eliminating them altogether.19
They argue that rst-mover advantages, secrecy, and imitation delays pro-
vide ample protection for innovators and that an economy without patent
and copyright systems would have a better allocation of resources than the
current regime in which copyright protection is essentially indenite and
patentsareusedasaweapontodiscourageinnovation. Eachofthesepapers
makes a useful contribution by attempting to create new institutions that





number of people simultaneously without degradation means that there is
something special about the rst instantiation of an idea. There is a cost
to creating an idea in the rst place that does not have to be reincurred as
the idea gets used by more and more people. This xed cost implies that
production is, at least in the absence of some other xed factor like land,
characterized by increasing returns to scale.
Notice that nothing in this argument relies on a low marginal cost of
production or on the absence of learning and human capital. Consider
the design of a new drug for treating high blood pressure. Discovering the
precisechemicalformulationforthedrugmayrequirehundredsofmillions
19See also the important elaborations and clarications in Quah (2002).38 CHARLES I. JONES
of dollars of research effort. This idea is then simply a chemical formula.
Producing copies of the drug  pills  may be expensive, for example if
the drug involves the use of a rare chemical compound. It may also be such
that only the best-trained biochemists have the knowledge to understand
the chemical formula and manufacture the drug. Nevertheless, an accurate
characterizationoftheproductiontechnologyforproducingthedrugisasa
xedresearchcostfollowedbyaconstantmarginalcost. Oncethechemical
formula is discovered, to double the production of pills we simply double
the number of highly-trained biochemists, build a new (identical) factory,
and purchase twice as much of the rare chemical compound used as an
input.
Becausethelinkbetweenidea-basedgrowththeoryandincreasingreturns
is so strong, the role of scale effects in growth models has been the
focus of a series of theoretical and empirical papers. In discussing these
papers, it is helpful to consider two forms of scale effects. In models
that exhibit strong scale effects, the growth rate of the economy is an
increasing function of scale (which typically means overall population or
the population of educated workers). Examples of such models include
the rst-generation models of Romer (1990), Aghion and Howitt (1992),
and Grossman and Helpman (1991). On the other hand, in models that
exhibit weak scale effects, the level of per capita income in the long run
is an increasing function of the size of the economy. This is true in the
semi-endogenous growth models of Jones (1995a), Kortum (1997), and
Segerstrom (1998) that were written at least partially in response to the
strong scale effects in the rst generation models. The models examined
formally in the previous sections of this chapter t into this category as
well.
To use an analogy from the computer software industry, are scale effects
a bug or a feature? I believe the correct answer is slightly complicated.GROWTH AND IDEAS 39
I will argue that overall they are a feature, i.e. a useful prediction of the




the long-run growth rate of the economy depends on its scale  is a bug.
Subsequent research has remedied this problem, maintaining everything
thatisimportantaboutidea-basedgrowthmodelsbuteliminatingthestrong
formofthescaleeffectsprediction. Thisstillleavesus, asdiscussedabove,
with a weak form of scale effects: the size of the economy affects, in some
sense, the level of per capita income. This, of course, is nothing more
than a statement that the economy is characterized by increasing returns to
scale. The weak form of scale effects has its critics as well, but I will argue
two things. First, these criticisms are generally misplaced. And second,
it's fortunate that this is the case: the weak form of scale effects is so
inextricably tied to idea-based growth models that rejecting one is largely
equivalent to rejecting the other.
The remainder of this section consists of two basic parts. Section 5.1
returns to the simple growth model presented in Section 3 to formalize the
strong and weak versions of scale effects. The remaining sections then
discuss a range of applications in the literature related to scale effects.
5.1. Strong and Weak Scale Effects
The simple model in Section 3 revealed that the growth rate of per capita
income is proportional to the growth rate of the stock of ideas. Consider
that same model, but replace the idea production function in equation (7)
with
_ At = L
AtA

t : (59)40 CHARLES I. JONES
We could go further and incorporate human capital, as we did in the richer
model of Section 4, but this will not change the basic result, so we will
leave out this complication.
Nowconsidertwocases. Intherst,weimposetheconditionthat < 1.
In the second, we will instead assume that  = 1. In the case of  < 1, the
analysis goes through exactly as in the models developed earlier, and the





which pins down all the key growth rates in the model. Notice that, as
before, the growth rate is proportional to the rate of population growth. It
is straightforward to show, as we did earlier, that the level of per capita
income in such an economy is an increasing function of the size of the
population. That is, this model exhibits weak scale effects. Finally, notice
that this equation cannot apply if  = 1; in that case, the denominator
would explode.
Toseemoreclearlythesourceoftheproblem,rewritetheideaproduction





In this case, the growth rate of knowledge is proportional to the number of
researchers raised to some power . If the number of researchers is itself
growing over time, the simple model will not exhibit a balanced growth
path. Rather, the growth rate itself will be growing! With  = 1, the
simple model exhibits strong scale effects.
The rst generation idea-based growth models of Romer (1990), Aghion
and Howitt (1992), and Grossman and Helpman (1991) all include idea
production functions that essentially make the assumption of  = 1, andGROWTH AND IDEAS 41
all exhibit the strong form of scale effects.20 The problem with the strong
form of scale effects is easy to document and understand. Because the
growth rate of the economy is an increasing function of research effort,
these models require research effort to be constant over time to match
the relative stability of growth rates in the United States and some other
advanced economies. However, research effort is itself growing over time
(for example, if for no other reason than simply because the population is
growing). These facts are now documented in more detail.
A useful stylized fact that any growth model must come to terms with
is the relative stability of growth rates in the United States over more than
a century. This stability can be easily seen by plotting per capita GDP
for the United States on a logarithmic scale, as shown in Figure 1. A
straight line with a growth rate of 1.8 percent per year provides a very
accurate description of average growth rates in the United States dating
back to 1870. There are departures from this line, of course, most clearly
corresponding to the Great Depression and the recovery following World
War II. But what is truly remarkable about this gure is how well a straight
line describes the trend.
Jones (1995b) made this point in the following way. Suppose one drew
a trend line using data from 1870 to 1929 and then extrapolated that line
forward to predict per capita GDP today. It turns out that such a prediction
matches up very well with the current level of per capita GDP, conrming
the hypothesis that growth rates have been relatively stable on average.21
20This is easily seen in the Romer expanding variety model, as that model is the building
block for the models developed in this chapter. It is slightly trickier to see this in the quality
ladder models of Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Grossman and Helpman (1991). In those
models, each researcher produces a constant number of ideas, but ideas get bigger over
time. In particular, each new idea generates a proportional improvement in productivity.
21Of course this is only an approximation. The growth rate from 1950 to 1994 averaged
1.95 percent, while the growth rate from 1870 to 1929 averaged 1.75 percent (see, e.g.,
Ben-David and Papell (1995) on this increase). On the other hand, the 2.20 percent growth
rate in the 1950s and 1960s is slightly higher than the 1.74 percent growth rate after 1970,42 CHARLES I. JONES
FIGURE 1. U.S. GDP Per Capita, Log Scale









Note: Data from Maddison (1995).
This stylized fact represents an important benchmark that any growth
model must match. Whatever the engine driving long run growth, it must
(a) be able to produce relatively stable growth rates for a century or more,
and (b) must not predict that growth rates in the United States over this
period of time should depart from such a pattern. To see this force of
this argument, consider rst a theory like Lucas (1988) that predicts that
investment in human capital is the key to growth. In this model, the growth
rate of the economy is proportional to the investment rate in human capital.
But if investment rates in human capital have risen signicantly in the 20th
century in the United States, as data on educational attainment suggests,
reecting the productivity slowdown. Similar results can be obtained with GDP per worker
and GDP per hour worked, see Williams (1995).GROWTH AND IDEAS 43
FIGURE 2. Researchers and Employment in the G-5 Countries (Index)













Note: From calculations in Jones (2002b). Data on researchers before 1950
in countries other than the United States is backcasted using the 1965 research
share of employment. The G-5 countries are France, Germany, Japan, the
United Kingdom, and the United States.
this is a problem for the theory. It could be rescued if investment rates in
human capital in the form of on-the-job training have fallen to offset the
rise in formal education, but there is little evidence suggesting that this is
the case.
This stylized fact is even more problematic for the rst-generation idea-
based growth models of Romer (1990), Aghion and Howitt (1992), and
Grossman and Helpman (1991) (R/AH/GH). These models predict that
growth is an increasing function of research effort, but research effort has
apparently grown tremendously over time. As one example of this fact,
consider Figure 2. This gure plots an index of the number of scientists44 CHARLES I. JONES
and engineers engaged in research in the G-5 countries. Between 1950 and
1993, this index of research effort rose by more than a factor of eight. In
part this is because of the general growth in employment in these countries,
but as the gure shows, it also reects a large increase in the fraction of
employment devoted to research. A similar fact can be documented using
justthedatafortheUnitedStates, orbylookingatspendingonR&Drather
than employment.22 The bottom line is that resources devoted to research
have exhibited a tremendous amount of growth in the post-war period,
while growth rates in the United States have been relatively stable. The
implication is that models that exhibit strong scale effects are inconsistent
withthebasictrendsinaggregatedata. Evidencelikethisisoneofthemain
arguments in favor of models that exhibit weak scale effects instead.23
5.2. Growth Effects and Policy Invariance
At some level, the rejection of models with strong scale effects in favor
of models with weak scale effects should not be especially interesting. The
only difference between the two models, as discussed above, is essentially
the strength of the knowledge spillover parameter. In expanding variety
models, is = 1oris < 1? Nothingintheevidencenecessarilyrulesout
 = :95, and continuity arguments suggest that the economics of  = :95
and  = 1 cannot be that different.
22There are several ways to look at the R&D spending share of GDP. For total R&D
expenditures as a share of GDP in the United States, most of the increase in the R&D share
occursbefore1960. However,ifonesubstractsoutR&Dexpendituresondefenseandspace
(which might be a reasonable thing to do since government output is valued at cost), or if
onefocusesonnon-federally-nancedresearch, thetrendintheU.S.shareemergesclearly;
see Chapter 4 of the NSF's Science and Engineering Indicators, 2004. Alternatively, there
are substantial trends in the R&D shares for most of the other G-7 countries; in addition to
the2004edition, seealsothe1993editionoftheNSF'sScienceandEngineeringIndicators
to get data on the research shares back to 1970.
23The other main argument is the linearity critique discussed further in Section 6.2.GROWTH AND IDEAS 45
The main difference in the economic results that one obtains in the two
models pertains to the ability of changes in policy to alter the long-run
growth rate of the economy. In the models that exhibit strong scale ef-
fects, the long-run growth rate is an increasing function of the number of
researchers. Hence, a policy that increases the number of researchers, such
as an R&D expenditure subsidy, will increase the long-run growth rate. In
contrast, if  < 1, then the long run growth rate depends on elasticities of
production functions and on the rate of population growth. To the extent
that these parameters are unaffected by policy  as one might naturally
take to be the case, at least to a rst approximation  policy changes such
as a subsidy to R&D or a tax on capital will have no affect on the long-run
growth rate. They will of course affect the long-run level of income and
will affect the growth rate along a transition path, but the long-run growth
rate is invariant to standard policy changes.
This statement can be qualied in a couple of ways. First, the population
growthrateisreallyanendogenousvariabledeterminedbyfertilitychoices
of individuals. Policy changes can affect this choice and hence can affect
long-rungrowtheveninamodelwithweakscaleeffects, asshowninJones
(2003). However, the effects can often be counter to the usual direction.
For example, a subsidy to R&D can lead people to perform more research
and have fewer kids, reducing fertility. Hence a subsidy to research can
reduce the long-run growth rate. This can be true even if it is optimal to
subsidize research  this kind of model makes clear that long-run growth
and welfare are two very different concepts. The second qualication is
that one can imagine subsidies that affect the direction of research and that
can possibly affect long-run growth. For example, Cozzi (1997) constructs
a model in which research can proceed in different directions that may
involve different knowledge spillover elasticities. By shifting research to46 CHARLES I. JONES
the directions with high spillovers, it is possible to change the long-run
growth rate.
Despite these qualications, it remains true that in the semi-endogenous
growth models written to address the problem of strong scale effects,
straightforward policies do not affect the long-run growth rate. This has
led a number of researchers to seek alternative means of eliminating the
strong scale effects prediction while maintaining the potency of policy
to alter the long-run growth rate. Key papers in this line of research in-
clude Young (1998), Peretto (1998), Dinopoulos and Thompson (1998),
and Howitt (1999) (Y/P/DT/H).
These papers all work in a similar way.24 In particular, each adds a
second dimension to the model, so that research can improve productivity
for a particular product or can add to the variety of products. To do this in
the simplest way, suppose that aggregate consumption (or output) is a CES








;  > 1; (62)
where Bt represents the variety of goods that are available at date t and Yit
is the output of variety i. Assume that each variety Yi is produced using
the Romer-style technology with  = 1 in the simple model given earlier
in Section 3.
Thekeytothemodelisthewayinwhichthenumberofdifferentvarieties




24This section draws heavily on Jones (1999).GROWTH AND IDEAS 47
That is, the number of varieties is proportional to the population raised to
some power . Notice that this relationship could be given microfounda-
tions with an idea production function analogous to that in equation (16).25
Finally,let'sassumeeachintermediatevarietyisusedinthesamequantity
so that Yit = Yt, implying Ct = B
t Yt. Per capita consumption is then
ct = B
t yt, and per capita consumption growth along a balanced growth
path is
gc = gB + gA = n + gA: (64)
Assuming an idea production function with  = 1, like that in R/AH/GH,
the growth rate of the stock of ideas is proportional to research effort per
variety, LAt=Bt = sLt=Bt:
gA = sLt=Bt = sL
1 
t : (65)
Substituting this equation back into (64) gives the growth rate of per capita
output as a function of exogenous variables and parameters:
gc = n + sL
1 
t : (66)
With = 1sothatBt = Lt,thestrongscaleeffectiseliminatedfromthe
model, while the effect of policy on long-run growth is preserved. That is,
a permanent increase in the fraction of the labor force working in research,
s, will permanently raise the growth rate. This is the key result sought by
the Y/P/DT/H models.
However, there are two important things to note about this result. First,
itisveryfragile. Inparticular, to the extent that 6= 1, problemsreemerge.
If  < 1, then the model once again exhibits strong scale effects. Alterna-
tively,if > 1,thenchangesinsnolongerpermanentlyaffectthelong-run
25For example, if _ B = LB

, then equation (63) holds holds along a balanced growth
path with  = 1=(1   
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growth rate. Thus, the Y/P/DT/H result depends crucially on a knife-edge
case for this parameter value, in addition to the Romer-like knife-edge as-
sumption of  = 1. Second, as the rst term in equation (66) indicates,
the model still exhibits the weak form of scale effects. This result is not
surprising given that these are idea-based growth models, but it is useful to
recognize since many of the papers in this literature have titles that include
the phrase growth without scale effects. What these titles really mean
is that the papers attempt to eliminate strong scale effects; all of them still
possess weak scale effects. These points are discussed in more detail in
Jones (1999), Li (2000), and Li (2002).
5.3. Cross-Country Evidence on Scale Effects
One source of evidence on the empirical relevance of scale effects comes
from looking across countries or regions at a point in time. Consider rst
the ideal cross-sectional evidence. One would observe two regions, one
larger than the other, that are otherwise identical. The two regions would
not interact in any way and the only source of new ideas in the two regions
would be the regions' own populations. In such an ideal experiment, one
could search for scale effects by looking at the stock of ideas and at per
capita income in each region over time. In the long-run, one would expect
that the larger region would end up being richer.
In practice, of course, this ideal experiment is never observed. Instead,
we have data on different countries and regions in the world, but these
regions almost certainly share ideas and they almost certainly are not equal
in other dimensions. It falls to clever econometricians to use this data
to approximate the ideal experiment. No individual piece of evidence is
especiallycompelling,butthecollectiontakentogetherdoesindeedsuggest
that the cross-sectional evidence on scale effects supports the basic model.GROWTH AND IDEAS 49
Certainly the most creative approximation to date is found in Kremer
(1993) and later appears in the Pulitzer Prize-winning book Guns, Germs,
and Steel by Jared Diamond (1997). The most recent ice age ended about
10,000 B.C. Before that time, ocean levels were lower, allowing humans to
migratearoundtheworldforexampleacrosstheBeringStraitandintothe
Americas. In this sense, ideas could diffuse across regions. However, with
theendoftheiceage, sealevelsrose, andvariousregionsoftheworldwere
effectively isolated from each other, at least until the advent of large sailing
ships sometime around the year 1000 or 1500. In particular, for approxi-
mately 12,000 years, ve regions were mutually isolated from one another:
the Eurasian/African continents, the Americas, Australia, Tasmania (an is-
land off the coast of Australia), and the Flinders Island (a very small island
off the coast of Tasmania). These regions are also nicely ranked in terms
of population sizes, from the relatively highly-populated Eurasian/African
continent down to the small Flinders Island, with a population that likely
numbered fewer than 500.
It is plausible that 12,000 years ago these regions all had similar tech-
nologies: all were relatively primitive hunter-gatherer cultures. Now fast-
forwardtotheyear1500whenawaveofEuropeanexplorationreintegrates
the world. First, the populous Old World has the highest level of techno-
logicalsophistication; theyaretheonesdoingtheexploring. TheAmericas
follownext, withcities, agriculture, andtheAztecandMayancivilizations.
Australia is in the intermediate position, having developed the boomerang,
the atlatl, re-making, and sophisticated stone tools, but still consisting of
a hunter-gatherer culture. Tasmania is relatively unchanged, and the pop-
ulation of Flinders Island had died out completely. The technological rank
of these regions more than 10,000 years later matches up exactly with their
initial population ranks at the end of the last ice age.50 CHARLES I. JONES
Turning to more standard evidence from the second-half of the twentieth
century, oneisrststruckbytheapparentlackofsupportforthehypothesis
of weak scale effects. The most populous countries of the world, China
and India, are among the poorest, while some of the smallest countries like
HongKongandLuxembourgareamongtherichest. Andthecountrieswith
the most rapid rates of population growth  many in Africa  are among
the countries with the slowest rates of per capita income growth. How-
ever, a moment's thought suggests that one must be careful in interpreting
this evidence. It is clearly not the case that Hong Kong and Luxembourg
are isolated countries that grow solely based on the ideas created by their
own populations. These countries benet tremendously from ideas created
aroundtheworld. Andinthecaseofthepoorcountriesoftheworld, other
things are clearly not equal. These countries have very different levels of
human capital and different policies, institutions, and property rights that
contribute to their poverty. Hence, we must turn to econometric evidence
that seeks to neutralize these differences.
The clearest cross-country evidence in favor of weak scale effects comes
from papers that explicitly control for differences in international trade.
Intuitively, openness to international trade is likely related to openness to
idea ows, and the ow of ideas from other countries is one of the key
factors that needs to be neutralized. Backus, Kehoe and Kehoe (1992),
Frankel and Romer (1999), and Alcala and Ciccone (2002) are the main
examples of this line of work, and all nd an important role for scale.
Alcala and Ciccone (2002) provide what is probably the best specication,
controlling for both trade and institutional quality (and instrumenting for
these endogenous variables), but the results in Frankel and Romer (1999)
aresimilar. AlcalaandCicconendalong-runelasticityofGDPperworkerGROWTH AND IDEAS 51
with respect to the size of the workforce that is equal to 0.20.26 That is,
holdingotherthingsequal,a10percentincreaseinthesizeoftheworkforce
in the long run is associated with a 2 percent higher GDP per worker.27
Other cross-country studies, of course, have not been able to precisely
estimate this elasticity. Hall and Jones (1999), for example, found a point
estimate of about 0.05, but with a standard error of 0.06. Sala-i-Martin
(1997) does not nd the size of the population to be a robust variable in his
four million permutations of cross-country growth regressions. Finally, it
should be recognized that this cross-country estimate of the scale elasticity
isnotnecessarilyanestimateofthestructuralparameter
 intheideamodels
presented earlier in Section 4. One needs a theory of technology adoption
and idea ows in order to make sense of the estimates. For example, in
a world where ideas ow to all places instantaneously, there would be no
reason to nd a scale effect in the cross-section evidence.
A nal piece of evidence that is often misinterpreted as providing evi-
denceagainsttheweakscaleeffectspredictionisthenegativecoefcienton
populationgrowthinacross-countrygrowthregression,suchasinMankiw,
Romer and Weil (1992). Recall that the standard interpretation of these re-
gressions is that they are estimating transition dynamics. The negative
coefcient on population growth is interpreted as capturing the dilution of
the investment rate associated with the Solow model. Consider two coun-
triesthatareidenticalbutfordifferentpopulationgrowthrates. Thecountry
with the faster population growth rate must equip a larger number of new
workers with the existing capital-labor ratio, effectively diluting the invest-
ment rate. The result is that such an economy has a lower capital-output
26The standard error of this particular point estimate is about 0.10. Across different
specications, the elasticity ranges from a low of about 0.10 to a high of about 0.40.
27Of course in the model with trade, other things would not be equal: a change in
population would almost surely affect the trade-GDP ratios that measure openness in the
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ratio in steady state, reducing output per worker along the balanced growth
path. But this same force is also at work in any growth model, including
idea-based models, as was apparent above in Result (1b). The implication
is that this cross-country evidence is not inconsistent with models in which
weak scale effects play a role.
5.4. Growth over the Very Long Run
Additional evidence on the potential relevance of scale effects to eco-
nomic growth comes from what at rst might seem an unlikely place: the
history of growth from thousands of years ago to the present.
Oneoftheimportantapplicationsofmodelsofeconomicgrowthinrecent
years has been to understand economic growth over this very long time
period. Many of our workhorse models of growth were constructed with
an eye toward 20th-century growth. Asking how well they explain growth
over a much longer period of time therefore provides a nice test of our
models.
The key fact that must be explained over this period is quite stunning
and is displayed in Figure 3. For thousands and thousands of years prior
to the Industrial Revolution, standards of living were relatively low. In
particular, the evidence suggests that there was no sustained growth in per
capita incomes before the Industrial Revolution.28 Then, quite suddenly
from the standpoint of the sweep of world history, growth rates accelerated
and standards of living began rising with increasing rapidity. At the world
level, per capita income today is probably about 10 timeshigher than it was
in the year 1800 or 1500 or even 10,000 years ago. A profound question in
economic history  and one that growth economists have begun delving
into  is this: How do we understand this entire time path? Why were
28See Lucas (1998), Galor and Weil (2000), Jones (2001), and Clark (2001) for a discus-
sion of this evidence.GROWTH AND IDEAS 53
FIGURE 3. World Per Capita GDP (log scale)









a zero growth rate, as suggested by Maddison and others.
standards of living relatively low and stagnant for so long, why have they
risen so dramatically in the last 150 years, and what changed?29
Therecentgrowthliteratureonthisquestionisquitelarge,andathorough
reviewisbeyondthescopeofthepresentchapter(additionaldiscussioncan
be found in Chapter ??? of this handbook, by Oded Galor). Representative
papers include Lee (1988), Kremer (1993), Goodfriend and McDermott
29A cottage industry(!) in recent years has sprung up in which macroeconomists bring
their modeling tools to bear on major questions in economic history. In addition to growth
over the very long run, macroeconomists have studied the Great Depression (Ohanian and
Cole (2001)), the Second Industrial Revolution (Atkeson and Kehoe (2002)), and the rise in
female labor force participation over the course of the 20th century (Greenwood, Seshadri
and Yorukoglu 2001) among other topics.54 CHARLES I. JONES
(1995), Lucas (1998), Galor and Weil (2000), Clark (2001), Jones (2001),
Stokey (2001), Hansen and Prescott (2002), and Tamura (2002).
In several of these papers, scale effects play a crucial role. Scale is at the
heart of the models of Lee (1988), Kremer (1993), and Jones (2001), and
it also plays an important role in getting growth started in the model based
on human capital in Galor and Weil (2000).
Theroleofscaleeffectsinthesemodelscanbeillustratedmosteffectively
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Equation(67)describesaproductionfunctionthatdependsonideasA,labor
L,andlandT,whichisassumedtobeinxedsupplyandnormalizedtoone.
Equation (68) is a Romer-like production function for new ideas. Notice
thatwehaveassumedthe = 1casesothatwecangetananalyticsolution
below, but the nature of the results does not depend on this assumption.
Notice also that we assume all labor can produce ideas, and we assume
a log form. This makes the model log-linear, which is the second key
assumption needed to get a closed-form solution. Finally, equation (69) is
a Malthusian equation describing population growth. If output per person
is greater than the subsistence parameter  y, then population grows; if less
then population declines.
The model can be solved as follows. First, choose the units of output
such that the subsistence term gets normalized to zero, log  y = 0. Next, let
a  logAand`  logL. ThenthemodelreducestoalinearhomogeneousGROWTH AND IDEAS 55
system of differential equations:
_ at = 
`t (70)
_ `t = at   `t: (71)




= !1e1t + !2e2t; (72)
where 1 > 0 and 2 < 0 are the eigenvalues associated with this system,
and !1 > 0.30 That is, the solution involves a double exponential: the
natural log of output per worker grows exponentially, so that the growth
rate of output per worker, y  Y=L, itself grows exponentially:
_ yt
yt
= !11e1t + !22e2t: (73)
Mathematically, it is this double exponential growth that allows the model
to deliver a graph that looks approximately like that in Figure 3.
Analytically,Lee'sresultisextremelynice. However,theanalyticresults
are obtained only by simplifying the model considerably  perhaps too
much. For example, the model generates double exponential growth in
population as well. As shown in Kremer (1993), this pattern ts the broad
sweepofworldhistory,butitsharplycontradictsthedemographictransition
that has set in over the last century, where population growth rates level off
and decline. In addition, the analytic results require the strong assumption
that  = 1.
If one wishes to depart from the log-linear structure of Lee's model, the
analysismustbeconductednumerically. ThisisdoneinJones(2001), with
30Thedifferentialsystemcanbesolvedusinglinearalgebra,asinBarroandSala-i-Martin
(1995, page 480) or, even more intuitively, by writing it as a single 2nd order differential
equation, as in Boyce and DiPrima (1997, pp. 123-125). The values for the constants in
equation (72) are 1 = (  +
p
()2 + 4




!1 = 1=((a0 `0) 2`0)=(1 2),!2 = 2=(1`0 (a0 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a more realistic demographic setup and with an idea production function
that incorporates  < 1. The basic insights from Lee (1988) apply over
the broad course of history, but the model also predicts a demographic
transitionandalevelingoffofpercapitaincomegrowthinthe20thcentury.
The model with weak scale effects, then, is able to match the basic facts
of income and population growth over both the very long run and the 20th
century.
The economic intuition for these results is straightforward. Thousands
and thousands of years ago, the population was relatively small and the
productivity of the population at producing ideas was relatively low. Per
capitaconsumption,then,stayedaroundtheMalthusianlevelthatkeptpop-
ulation constant ( y in the Lee model above). Suppose it took 1000 years
for this population to discover a new idea. With the arrival of the new idea,
per capita income and fertility rose, producing a larger population. Dimin-
ishing returns associated with a xed supply of land drove consumption
back to its subsistence level, but now the population was larger. Instead of
requiring1000yearstoproduceanewidea,thislargerpopulationproduced
a new idea sooner, say in 800 years. Continuing along this virtuous cir-
cle, growth gradually accelerated. Provided the economic environment is
characterized by a sufciently large degree of increasing returns (to offset
the diminishing returns associated with limited land), the acceleration in
population growth produces a scale effect that leads to the acceleration of
per capita income growth. Eventually, the economy becomes sufciently
rich that a demographic transition sets in, leading population growth and
per capita income growth to level out.31
31Itiseven possibleforthedemographic transitiontodrive population growthratesdown
to zero, in which cases per capita income growth rates decline as well. There is always
growth in this world  even a constant population produces new ideas  but the growth
rate is no longer exponential. See Jones (2001).GROWTH AND IDEAS 57
5.5. Summary: Scale Effects
Virtually all idea-based growth modelsinvolve some kind ofscale effect,
for the basic reason laid out earlier in the presentation of the Idea Diagram.
Thestrongscaleeffectsofmanyrst-generationidea-basedgrowthmodels
 in which the growth rate of the economy is an increasing function of
its size  are inconsistent with the relative stability of growth rates in the
United States in the 20th century. Subsequent idea-based growth models
replacedthisstrongscaleeffectwithaweakscaleeffect,wherethelong-run
level of per capita income is an increasing function of the size of the econ-
omy. The long-run growth rate in these models is generally an increasing
function of the rate of growth of research effort, which in turn depends on
the population growth rate of the countries contributing to world research.
However, thisgrowthrateistypicallytakentobeexogenous, producingthe
policy-invariance results common in these models.
Simplecorrelations(sayofincomeperpersonwithpopulation,orgrowth
rates of per capita income with population growth rates) on rst glance ap-
peartobeinconsistentwithweakscaleeffects. However,theceterisparibus
assumption is not valid for such comparisons. Attempts to render other
things equal using careful econometrics certainly reveal no inconsistency
withtheweakscaleeffectsprediction,althoughtheyalsodonotnecessarily
provide precise estimates of the magnitude of the key scale elasticity.
Morebroadly,theverylong-runhistoryofeconomicgrowthappearscon-
sistent with weak scale effects. Models in which scale plays an important
role have proven capable of explaining the very long-run dynamics of pop-
ulation and per capita income, including the extraordinarily slow growth
over much of history and the transition to modern economic growth since
the Industrial Revolution.58 CHARLES I. JONES
6. GROWTH ACCOUNTING, THE LINEARITY CRITIQUE, AND
OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS
This section summarizes a variety of additional insights related to idea-
based growth models. Section 6.1 discusses growth accounting in such
models,showingthatscaleeffectshaveaccountedforonlyabout20percent
of U.S. growth in the post-war period. Increases in educational attainment
and increases in R&D intensity account for the remaining 80 percent. Sec-
tion 6.2 considers a somewhat controversial linearity critique of endoge-
nous growth models that rst appeared in the 1960s. Finally, Section 6.3
will discuss briey several other important contributions to the literature
on growth and ideas that have not yet been mentioned.
6.1. Growth Accounting in Idea-Based Models
Growth accounting in a neoclassical framework has a long, illustrious
tradition, beginningwithSolow(1957). Asiswellknown, suchaccounting
typicallyndsaresidual,whichislabeledtotalfactorproductivitygrowth
(TFPgrowth). Insomeways,endogenousgrowthmodelscanbeunderstood
as trying to nd ways to endogenize TFP growth, i.e. to make it something
that is determined within the model rather than assumed to be completely
exogenous. Having such a model in hand, then, it is quite natural to ask
how the model decomposes growth into its sources. That is, quantitatively,
how does a particular model account for growth?
Jones (2002b) conducts one of these growth accounting exercises in an
economic environment that is basically identical to that analyzed in Sec-
tion 4. In the long run in that model, per capita growth is proportional to
therateofpopulationgrowthoftheidea-producingregions. Offabalanced
growth path, of course, growth can come from transition dynamics, for
example due to capital deepening or to rapid growth in the stock of ideas.
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over a long period of time, one might be tempted to think that the U.S. is
close to its balanced growth path so that growth due to transition dynamics
is negligible. On the contrary, however, Jones shows that just the opposite
is true. Approximately 80 percent of U.S. growth in the post-war period is
due to transition dynamics associated in roughly equal parts with increases
in educational attainment and with increases in world R&D intensity. Only
about 20 percent of U.S. growth is attributed to the scale effect associated
with population growth in the idea-generating countries.32
This nding raises a couple of important questions. First, how it is that
growth rates can be relatively stable in the United States if transition dy-
namics are so important? The answer proposed by Jones (2002b) can be
seen in a simple analogy. Consider a standard Solow (1956) model that
begins in steady state. Now suppose the investment rate increases perma-
nently by 1 percentage point. We know that growth rates rise temporarily
and then decline. Now suppose the investment rate, rather than staying
constant, grows exponentially. We know that this cannot happen forever
since the investment rate is bounded below one. However, it could happen
for awhile. In such a world, it is possible for the continued increases in
the investment rate to sustain a constant growth rate that is higher than the
long-run growth rate. In the idea-based growth model analyzed by Jones
(2002b), it is not the investment rate in physical capital that is driving the
transitiondynamics. Instead, educationalattainmentandresearchintensity
(the fraction of the labor force working to produce ideas in advanced coun-
tries)appear to berisingsmoothly ina way that can generate stablegrowth,
at least as an approximation.
32Comin (2002) suggests that the contribution of R&D to growth could be even smaller.
The key assumptions he needs to get this result are that R&D as a share of GDP is truly
small, as measured, and that the elasticity of output with respect to ideas is small.60 CHARLES I. JONES
Thesecondnaturalquestionraisedbythisaccountingconcernsthefuture
of U.S. growth. If 80 percent of U.S. growth is due to transition dynamics,
then a straightforward implication of the result is that growth rates could
slow substantially at some point in the future when the U.S. transits to its
balancedgrowthpath. Totheextentthatpopulationgrowthratesintheidea-
producing countries are declining, this nding is reinforced. Still, there are
many other qualications that must be made concerning this result. Most
importantly, it is not clear when the transition dynamics will run out,
particularly since the fraction of the labor force engaged in research seems
to be relatively small. In addition, the increased development of countries
like China and India means that the pool of potential idea creators could
rise for a long time.
6.2. The Linearity Critique
This section considers the somewhat controversial linearity critique
of endogenous growth models that rst appeared in the 1960s. A coarse
versionofthecriticismisthatsuchmodelsrelyonaknife-edgeassumption
thataparticulardifferentialequationislinearinsomesense. Ifthelinearity
is relaxed slightly, the model either doesn't generate long-run growth or
exhibits growth rates that explode. This section rst presents the basic
issue and then attempts to show how it can be used productively to make
progress in our understanding of economic growth.33
Growthmodelsthatarecapableofproducingsteady-stategrowthrequire
strongassumptions. Forexample, itiswell-knownthatsteady-stategrowth
is possible only if technological change is labor-augmenting or if the pro-
ductionfunctionisCobb-Douglas.34 Anotherrequirementisthatthemodel
mustpossessadifferentialequationthatislinear. Thatis,allgrowthmodels
33This section draws heavily on Jones (2003).
34See, for example, the Appendix to Chapter 2 in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995).GROWTH AND IDEAS 61
that exhibit steady-state growth ultimately rest on an assumption that some
differential equation takes the form
_ X = X: (74)
Growth models differ primarily according to the way in which they label
the X variable and the way in which they ll in the blank in this differential
equation.35
For example, in the Solow (1956) model without technological progress,
the differential equation for capital accumulation is less than linear, and the
model cannot produce sustained exponential growth. On the other hand,
when one adds exogenous technological change in the form of a linear
differential equation _ At = gAt, one obtains a model with steady-state
growth. In the AK growth models of Frankel (1962) and Rebelo (1991),
the law of motion for physical capital is assumed to be linear. In the human
capital model of Lucas (1988), it is the law of motion for human capital
accumulation that is assumed to be linear. Finally, in the rst-generation
idea-based growth models of Romer (1990), Aghion and Howitt (1992),
and Grossman and Helpman (1991), it is the idea production function itself
that is assumed to be a linear differential equation.
Thiskindofknife-edgerequirementhasmadeeconomistsuncomfortable
forsometime. Stiglitz(1990)andCannon(2000)notethatthisisonereason
endogenous growth models did not catch on in the 1960s even though
severalweredeveloped.36 Solow(1994)resurrectsthiscriticisminarguing
against recent models of endogenous growth.
35This approach to characterizing growth models is taken from Romer (1995). Two qual-
ications apply. First, this linearity can be hidden in models with multiple state variables,
as discussed in Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1993). Second, linearity is an asymptotic re-
quirement, not a condition that needs to hold at every point in time, as noted by Jones and
Manuelli (1990).
36The very nice AK model of Frankel (1962) is perhaps the clearest example.62 CHARLES I. JONES
What is not sufciently well-appreciated, however, is that any model of
sustained exponential growth requires such a knife-edge condition. Neo-
classical growth models are not immune to this criticism; they just assume
the linearity to be completely unmotivated. One can then proceed in two
possibledirections. First, onecangiveuponthedesirethatamodelexhibit
steady-state growth. It is not clear where this direction leads, however.
One still wants a model to be able to match the steady exponential growth
exhibited in the United States for the last 125 years, and it seems likely that
a model that produces this kind of behavior will require a differential equa-
tion that is nearly linear. Alternatively, one can see the linearity critique
as an opportunity for helping us improve our growth models. That is, if a
growth model requires a linear differential equation, one can look for an
economic explanation for why linearity should hold and/or seek empirical
evidence supporting the linearity.
To see how this might work, consider briey the main types of endoge-
nous growth models and the key differential equations of those models:
1. AK model _ K = sK
2. Lucas model _ h = uh
3. R/AH/GH model _ A = HAA
4. Fertility model _ N = (b   d)N
In each case, we can ask the question: Why should we believe that   1
isvalidinthismodel? Inparticular,weconsiderthefollowingexperiment.
Supposeweholdconstanttheindividualdecisionvariables(e.g. theinvest-
ment rate in physical capital or time spent accumulating human capital).
Suppose we then double the state variable. Do we double the change in the
state variable?
In the AK model,  is the elasticity of output with respect to capital. In
the absence of externalities, this elasticity is the share of capital in income.GROWTH AND IDEAS 63
Narrowly interpreting the model as applying to physical capital, one gets a
benchmarkvalueofabout1/3. Somepeopleprefertoincludehumancapital
as well, which can get the share a little higher.37 But then one must appeal
to large externalities, and these externalities must be exactly the right size
in order to get   1.
Now turn to the human capital model of Lucas (1988). Consider a rep-
resentative agent who lives forever and spends 10 hours per week studying
to obtain skills. Are the skills that are added by one period of this studying
doubled if the individual's stock of human capital is doubled? A natu-
ral benchmark might be that studying for 10 hours a week adds the same
amount, whether one is highly skilled or has little skill. It is far from ob-
vious that the 10 hours of studying increases skills proportionately over
time.38
This chapter has already discussed the Romer/AH/GH assumption of
 = 1. Recall that one can make a case for  < 0 if it gets harder over
time to nd new ideas or  > 0 if knowledge spillovers increase research
productivity, or even  = 0 if researchers produce a constant number of
ideas with each unit of effort. The case of  = 1 appears to have little in
the way of intuition or evidence to recommend it.
Finally, the last case above suggests placing the linearity in the equation
forpopulationgrowth,aswasdoneimplicitlyinthemodelsdiscussedearlier
in the chapter. It can be thought of in this way: Let b and d denote the birth
rate and the mortality rate for an individual, respectively. Hold constant an
37I personally think this is a mistake. Human capital is different from physical capital in
many ways and gets treated differently in models that are careful about the distinction, e.g.
Bils and Klenow (2000).
38A subtlety in thinking through the human capital model comes from the Mincerian
wage regression evidence. Each year of schooling appears to raise a worker's wage 
and hence productivity  by a constant percentage. One might be tempted to use this to
argue that  = 1 in the human capital case. Bils and Klenow (2000) suggest instead that
a human capital accumulation equation of the form _ h = e
uh
 is the right way to capture
this evidence.64 CHARLES I. JONES
individual'sfertilitybehavior,andsupposewedoublethenumberofpeople
in the population. A natural benchmark assumption is that we double the
number of offspring. This is the intuition for why a linear differential
equation makes sense as a benchmark for the population growth equation.
More generally, I would make the claim that population growth is the
least objectionable place to locate a linear differential equation in a growth
model, for two reasons. First, if we take population as exogenous and feed
in the observed population growth rates into an idea-based growth model,
we can explain sustained exponential growth. No additional linearity is
needed. Second, the intuition above suggests that it is not crazy to think
this differential equation might be close to linear: people reproduce in
proportion to their number.39
Thisisoneexampleofhowthelinearitycritiquecanbeusedproductively.
Proponents of particular endogenous growth models can seek evidence and
economic insights supporting the hypothesis that the particular engine of
growth in a model does indeed involve a differential equation that is close
to linear.
6.3. Other Contributions
There are a number of other very interesting papers that I have not had
time to discuss. These should be given more attention than simply the brief
mention that follows, but this chapter is already too long.
Kortum (1997) and Segerstrom (1998) are two important papers that
present growth models that exhibit weak scale effects. Both are motivated
in part by the stylized fact that total U.S. patents granted to U.S. inventors
does not show a large time trend for nearly a century, from roughly 1910
39This does not mean that fertility behavior, b, will ensure a positive rate of population
growth forever. That is a different question. Indeed, Jones (2001) supposes that a de-
mographic transition ultimately leads to zero population growth in attempting to explain
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until 1990. If patents are a measure of useful ideas, this fact suggests that
the number of new ideas per year might have been relatively stable during
a time when per capita income was growing at a relatively constant rate.
How can this be? In the models provided above, the stock of ideas grows
at a constant rate, just like output. Kortum (1997) and Segerstrom (1998)
solve this puzzle by supposing that ideas, at least on average, represent
proportional improvements in productivity. The papers also assume that
new ideas are increasingly difcult to obtain, so that in steady state, a
growing number of researchers produce a constant number of new ideas,
which in turn leads to a constant rate of exponential growth.
Romer (1994a) makes an interesting point that appears (at least based
on citations) to have been under appreciated in the literature. The paper
considers the welfare cost of trade restrictions from the standpoint of mod-
els in which ideas play an important role. In neoclassical models, trade
restrictions, like other taxes, typically have small effects associated with
Harberger triangles that depend on the square of the tax rate. In contrast,
Romer shows that if trade restrictions reduce the range of goods (ideas)
available within a country, the welfare affect is proportional to the level of
the tax rate rather than its square. As a result, distortions that affect the use
of ideas can have much larger welfare effects than those same distortions
in neoclassical models.
Acemoglu (2002) surveys a number of important results that come from
thinkingaboutthedirectionoftechnologicalchange. Inthisgeneralframe-
work, researchers can choose to search for ideas that augment different
factors. For example, they may search for ideas that augment capital or
skilled labor or unskilled labor. Other things equal, a market size effect
suggests that research will be targeted toward augmenting factors that are
in greater supply, especially when these factors can be easily substituted
for other factors of production.66 CHARLES I. JONES
Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell (1997) and Whelan (2001) focus on
the rapid technological change that is associated with the declines in the
relative prices of consumer and producer durables (driven in large part by
the rapid declines in the quality-adjusted price of semiconductors). Green-
wood et al. (1997) show that investment-specic technological change can
account for roughly half of per capita income growth in the United States
inrecent decades. Whelan (2001)extendsthis analysisby tying it tothe in-
troduction of chained indexes in the national income and product accounts.
Finally, it is worth mentioning again that this chapter has largely omitted
a very important part of the literature on growth and ideas, that associated
withtheSchumpeterianmodelsofAghionandHowitt(1992)andGrossman
and Helpman (1991) . These models were applied in detail to international
tradeinGrossmanandHelpman(1991). AghionandHowitt(1998)contain
a rich analysis of an even wider range of applications, to such topics as
unemployment, the effects of increases in competition, patent races, and
leader-follower effects in R&D. In addition to these excellent treatments, a
separate Handbook chapter by Aghion and Howitt surveys some of these
important topics.
7. CONCLUSIONS
Thinking carefully about the way in which ideas are different from other
economic goods leads to a profound change in the way we understand
economic growth. The nonrivalry of ideas implies that increasing returns
to scale is likely to characterize production possibilities. This leads to a
world in which scale itself can serve as a source of long run growth. The
more inventors we have, the more ideas we discover, and the richer we all
are. This also leads to a world where the rst fundamental welfare theorem
no long necessarily holds. Perfectly competitive markets may not lead to
the optimal allocation of resources. This means that other institutions mayGROWTH AND IDEAS 67
be needed to improve welfare. The patent system and research universities
are examples of such institutions, but there is little reason to think we've
foundthebestinstitutionsafteralltheseinstitutionsarethemselvesideas.
While we have made much progress in understanding economic growth
in a world where ideas are important, there remain many open, interesting
research questions. The rst is What is the shape of the idea production
function? How do ideas get produced? The combinatorial calculations of
Romer (1993) and Weitzman (1998) are fascinating and suggestive. The
current research practice of modeling the idea production function as a
stable Cobb-Douglas combination of research and the existing stock of
ideas is elegant, but at this point we have little reason to believe that it is
correct. One insight that illustrates the incompleteness of our knowledge
is that there is no reason why research productivity in the idea production
function should be a smooth, monotonic function of the stock of ideas.
One can easily imagine that some ideas lead to a domino-like unraveling of
phenomenathatwerepreviouslymysterious,muchlikethegeneralpurpose
technologies of Helpman (1998). Indeed, perhaps the decoding of the
human genome or the continued boom in information technology will lead
to a large upward shift in the production function for ideas.40 On the
other hand, one can equally imagine situations where research productivity
unexpectedlystagnates, ifnotforeverthenatleastforalongtime. Progress
in the time it takes to travel from New York to San Francisco represents a
good example of this.
AsecondunresolvedresearchquestionisWhatisthelong-runelasticity
of output per worker with respect to population? That is, how large are
increasing returns to scale. This parameter (labeled 
 in the main models
of this chapter) is crucially related to the long-run rate of growth of the
40Dale Jorgenson, in his Handbook chapter, suggests that the information technology
revolution may do just this.68 CHARLES I. JONES
economy. Estimating it precisely would not only provide conrmation
of idea-based growth theory but would also help us in accounting for the
sources of economic growth.
Finally, a policy-related question: What are better institutions and poli-
cies for encouraging the efcient amount of research? There is a large,
suggestive literature on social rates of return to research and on the extent
to which rms might underinvest in research. Still, none of these individ-
ual studies is especially compelling, and more accurate estimates of these
gaps would be valuable. To the extent that the returns to research do not
reect the marginal benet to society, better institutions might improve
allocations.
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